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Mathematics is like a language, although technically it is not a naturalor informal human language, but a formal, that is, artificially
constructed language. Importantly, we use our natural everyday language to
teach the formal language of mathematics. Sometimes we encounter prob-
lems when the technical words we use, as formal parts of mathematics,
conflict with an everyday understanding or
use of the same word, or related words. This
article discusses this problem, including
some examples, and offers some sugges-
tions for handling the difficulties. 
The first example arises in discussion of
changes of gradient, and rates of change of
gradient, of continuous functions. The
AAMT list community (aamt-l@edna.edu.au)
recently posted a message asking about
particular functions that decrease at an
increasing rate, or decrease at a decreasing
rate, or are combinations of increasing and
decreasing.
For example: “Would y = e–x be classified as
decreasing at an increasing rate or decreasing
at a decreasing rate?” (see Figure 1).
A reply was posted, saying that y = e–x
can be described as decreasing at a
decreasing rate, because the curve is defi-
nitely decreasing, and its rate of decrease is
also decreasing (i.e., it is going down, but
the rate at which it goes down becomes
slower and slower as values of the indepen-
dent variable x increase — it is the classic
“exponential decay” function).
It was also noted that the function y = –ex
is an example of a curve which is decreasing
Conceptual complexity
and apparent contradictions
in mathematics language
Figure 1. y = e–x.
Figure 2. y = –ex.
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Figure 3. y = ex.
Figure 4. y = –e–x.
at an increasing rate (see Figure 2). 
By contrast, y = ex increases at an
increasing rate, (this is the classic “expo-
nential growth” function; see Figure 3), and
y = –e–x increases at a decreasing rate (see
Figure 4).
Having got this far, the respondent
ended, remarking: “Now I just need to go
and lie down to stop my head spinning.”
Indeed. 
The unusual combinations and close
juxtapositions of words for up and down or
increasing and decreasing are conceptually
equivalent to feeling sea-sick. We read or
hear the words “increase” or “decrease” and
cannot prevent ourselves feeling some
sensory version of the meaning of the words.
Technically, in calculus, the issue is one
of comparing overall decrease or increase of
the y-value of the function, and overall
decrease or increase in the first derivative; is
the second derivative:
• positive?
• negative? or
• variable (as in the gradient of a cubic)?
What becomes conceptually tricky is the conceptual strength or
metaphorical power of the words being used. We hear these dynamic
metaphorical words and find it difficult to stop our imaginations inter-
preting them instantly — but there are conflicting imaginative pulls in
words that are conceptual opposites, that appear so close to one another in
the flow of discussion. (Also see Kristina Juter’s (2004, p. 230) discussion
of limits in functions: “everyday language can have a slightly different
meaning compared to the language used in mathematics… [such as]
convergence, arbitrarily close, tend to, and limit”.)
Similar conceptual conflicts arise when we consider “least upper-
bounds” and “greatest lower-bounds” in discussing sequences and series,
convergence, and limits. I recently came across a similar conceptual word
confusion in a television news Bureau of Meteorology weather report:
“Today’s maximum temperature was up to 5 degrees below the average
minimum…” What struck me as odd, in this calculus-free everyday
example, was the mixed conceptual implications of “up to” conflicting with
“below”.
Another oddity I have encountered occurs sometimes in accounts of
sailing ships in the South Atlantic and South Pacific, for example in
Geoffrey Blainey’s The Tyranny of Distance (1966, p. 7), and Alan Villier’s
Captain Cook: The Seamen's Seaman (1967, p. 209): the further south the
sailing ships go into the Roaring Forties, and further towards Antarctica,
the stronger the prevailing winds blowing from west to east around the
globe, across oceans unbroken by continental land. The odd expression is
that of the ships sailing into “higher latitudes,” where it is taken for granted
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that the context is the southern hemisphere. In my mind, at least, there is
a conceptual-lexical clash between “higher” (numerically higher, as ships
pass into latitude 40 degrees south, and move further towards 50 degrees
south), conflicting with my concept of “high” relative to the Earth as a phys-
ical globe, orientated, visually and spatially (and arbitrarily but
conventionally) with the North Pole at the “top”. In my spatially-challenged
mind the North Pole is “high”, but the South Pole is “low”. So the further
south the ships sail, the “lower” (spatially, on the surface of my mentally
imagined globe) they are going. Similarly Arctic explorers, in my thinking,
trek up to the North Pole, and Antarctic explorers trek down to the South
Pole. (This is further confused, in this latter case, because I also know that
the South Pole is on a high central ice-covered plateau, so the trek is also
“up” in terms of altitude above sea-level — another spatial concept!)
I am not alone in this way of thinking about the Earth, spatially. For
example, discussing global warming, Fen Montaigne (2004) refers to a “sub-
Antarctic system” (p. 39), meaning oceanic islands such as Heard, South
Georgia and the Falklands, which are in geographic proximity to the
Antarctic continent. Yet oddly, here, “sub-Antarctic” literally combines Latin
roots meaning under, opposite and Arctic; or more simply, “below” the
“Antarctic”. But what is “below” or “under” the Antarctic? The atmosphere
vertically over the South Pole — “lower” than the Earth’s globe, within the
plane of the Solar System? The Earth’s crust or magma beneath the tectonic
continental plate? Note, too, that Montaigne also speaks of the “high Arctic”
(p. 48), when speaking of polar bears in Canada’s Hudson Bay, where the
bay-ice is diminishing, and the bears may need to change their hunting and
breeding range if they are to survive loss of habitat. In this case, Montaigne
imagines the globe with the North Pole at the “top”, but with the ocean
fringing Antarctica being “sub-Antarctic” — literally “below” the Antarctic
(whatever that denotes). Implicitly, the meaning of “below” makes sense
only in terms of numerical magnitude of latitude, not in spatial or global
terms, in the way 30 is (numerically) “below” 40. 
A similar conceptual difficulty arises when we read, for example, of
someone saying, “I’d like to go up the Nile, wouldn’t you?” (Christie, 1937,
Chapter One: Part 8), and then mentally imagining the map of North Africa,
with the mouth of the Nile at the Mediterranean coast, the northern top of
the continent, and the mysterious origins of the river lost below, under-
neath, in the southwards African hinterland near the Mountains of the
Moon. Where is “up” on the Nile? 
This is perhaps more easily untangled, conceptually, because we also
know that water flows downwards, downhill, and sea-level is a kind of “zero”
towards which most rivers flow. Hence the convention is to speak of moving,
physically, upwards, uphill, or “upstream” (towards the higher altitudes
where rivers have their source) or “downstream” towards the sea. Hence we
also speak of going “up the airy mountain” (and “down the rushy glen”), and
going “down to the beach” (where “sea-level” is usually a notional “zero”).
Here, in the case of the Nile, the implied meaning of “up” is relative to the
flow of the water (and, implicitly, the lie of the land), rather than to compass
bearings, latitude, or the globe.
In all four cases (graphed functions, temperature variations, south-
bound sailing ships, and flowing rivers), on examination, we can find
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nothing literally wrong with the words, or with the concepts. The concepts
are correct, and the words are being correctly used. Despite this, my brain
usually teeters or registers a kind of mental jolt when I encounter these
verbal-conceptual clashes.
These examples would be trivial, especially for secondary teachers,
except for two factors. First, it is through the secondary years that mathe-
matics teachers formalise trigonometric and spherical calculations based
on latitude and longitude. Second, when students, even at advanced levels
of curriculum, are confronted by cognitive conflict, they are likely to revert
to much earlier ideas and conceptual-experiential metaphors (e.g., Davis
1984; Lakoff & Nunez, 2000).
Consider the less trivial, more problematic examples, such as what
happens when students encounter fractions and negative numbers. We
learn that fractions, such as one-quarter, one-fifth, one-sixth, and beyond,
get (numerically) smaller and smaller (as the denominator gets larger and
larger — and later we also encounter the idea of sequences and limits). We
also grasp the idea that zero is a kind of full-stop to this process. However,
we learn that, before reaching zero, the number-line contains an infinite or
unending succession of numerically (and spatially) smaller and smaller
(positive) fractions.
Incidentally, on the topic of fractions and misleading word use, John
Allen Paulos (1988) remarks wickedly that when he hears that something is
“selling for a fraction of its normal cost” he (mentally) comments “that the
fraction is probably 4/3” (p. 122). Our initial, and unhelpfully prolonged
exposure to fractions as not-quite-numbers and as parts-of-a-whole, and
hence as, preponderantly, less than 1, does not help us later when we need
to think far more flexibly about “fractions” as numbers of a particular kind,
and possibly of any numerical size. Fractions re-expressed as wholes (i.e.,
percentages) compound this. 
Then we encounter negative numbers! For example:
Which is “smaller”: –1000 or 0.000001?
We know 0.000001 is very small, compared with years of experience of posi-
tive whole numbers, some of which are very large. We also learn to see
negative numbers becoming “larger” (if only in absolute magnitude), in the
left-hand-side of the number-line, extending left past the zero-full-stop of
diminishing smallness for positive numbers. The mental shift across the
boundary of zero, from positive to negative (or from AD dates to BC dates)
can remain occasionally difficult for adults.
Zero causes other difficulties. Consider this example: 
A fence needs a fence post every 10 metres. We have a fence that is 1000
metres long: how many fence posts are needed? 
Having grown up counting from 1, and having learned multiplication and
division facts and processes that tend to neglect the zero-times multiplica-
tion table, we are more likely just to divide 1000 by 10 and reach the wrong
answer, neglecting the first fence-post that stands at the zero-starting point
of the fence.
Relationships, interactions and possible conflicts between language and
mathematics have been extensively discussed (e.g., Durkin & Shire, 1991;
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MacNeal, 1994). More recently, the discussion continues under the synony-
mous terms “literacy” and “numeracy” (although so called “literacy” is also
often taken as including, oddly, “oracy” — I prefer to distinguish “spoken”
from “written” language skills).
In particular, regarding the conceptual difficulties arising over “zero”,
MacNeal (1994, pp. 83–84) suggests that we:
• put a 0 at the left end of every ruler; 
• start counting with zero, in print and orally, from the beginning of
counting experiences (Sesame Street scriptwriters, take note!);
• put “zero is a number” into school policy; 
• display in every classroom a large dummy thermometer with a promi-
nent zero and a moveable degrees-pointer; and 
• speak of children younger than 1 as zero-year olds.
R. C. Ablewhite (1969, p. 32) gives an interesting way to regularise
counting and place-value: 
One, two, three… eight, nine, one-ty, 
one-ty one, one-ty two… one-ty eight, one-ty nine, two-ty, 
two-ty one, two-ty two…
We might also consider starting oral counting with, “none-ty, none-ty-
one, none-ty-two…” if only as a helpful step in remedial intervention with
students who are struggling with early place-value concepts.
As noted, mathematics is not a natural human language, but artificial,
supported by special alphanumeric characters and usages, non-alphanu-
meric symbols, special written formats within a single line, the clever use of
two or more lines at a time, and set-theoretic logical connectives. Also, in
important non-verbal ways, this “language” is supported crucially by
spatial-textual formatting devices and non-verbal images (see Barling’s
(2005) challenging discussion of specialised mathematical text and
symbolic formatting in our computer-keyboard and CAS era).
Importantly, as a deliberately constructed language where it does not
invent new terms (this is a rare event), mathematics borrows words that
already exist, with everyday meanings, and reshapes or redefines the
intended, specialist technical meaning. The result is that in classrooms we
speak to our students using our everyday language as the medium of
instruction, while trying to teach them how to speak and think in terms of
new, often different, technical meanings, using words that overlap with lay-
talk. It is valuable to discuss this overlap, and explore any possible
confusions arising from the tensions between language-of-instruction
versus subject-language.
Consider the potential conflicts between everyday and mathematical
meanings of common mathematical words such as: identity, axis (and axes),
volume, root, segment, power, exponent, cycle, etc.
Familiarity, as we know, breeds proverbial content: but this can be a
danger for teachers. Once we have learned the specialist technical mean-
ings, we are likely to forget that we might have ever ourselves have been
uncertain what the new meanings were about. It is valuable to develop a
heightened sensitivity to the vocabulary, the tools of our trade, regarding
our students as both practitioners and novices, thus helping them move
towards our own familiar multilingual expertise.
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How do our non-English speaking students cope with technical terms
that exist in the language of instruction, but which do not have effective
equivalents in their mother-tongue? When non-English mother-tongue-
speaking students talk about mathematics, for example, do they use their
mother tongue to do this? To some extent, this may occur with arithmetic
and numerical ideas, where the mother tongue’s almost-everyday words for
counting and numbers (and days of the week, etc.) can be used. Apart from
this mother-tongue translation of arithmetic, and some almost-everyday
measurement situations such as in shopping, other mathematical words
(such as hypotenuse, diagonal, rectangle, hexagon, triangle, circle, sine,
logarithm, area, surface, volume, length, mass and weight) may not have a
mother-tongue equivalent that is useful. You will only know if you ask your
students.
We should encourage our students to talk with each other, and with us,
about what we are trying to teach and they are trying to learn.
There is more at stake in learning mathematics as an abstract set of
concepts and technical processes than clarifying clashes between alterna-
tive meanings of words. Forming a conception, as we have seen, is itself
problematic. 
Edward MacNeal (1994) explores some of Piaget’s ideas about young chil-
dren’s thinking, combined with some of Alfred Korzybski’s theory of
semantics, the science of meanings in language. Korzybski’s key argument is
that our language, through different stages of our learning development from
child to autonomous adult, shapes the way we think in subtle ways usually
beyond our everyday awareness. Even the very structure of the language we
use influences how we think and how we use our thinking to learn.
Consider this statement: “Here is the number, 4.” According to
Korzybski, this is not actually the number 4; it is not even the numeral 4;
it is simply an example of something we call the numeral 4. Four strokes
|||| can be represented as Roman IV, in Base-ten Hindu-Arabic as or 
or , in French as “quatre”, in German “vier”, in Base-two as 100, in Base-
three as 11, using Dienes MAB blocks as four “minis”, on a hand as four
extended fingers and a closed thumb, and so on. Yet beneath the symbols,
the intended concept-object (a mental construct abstracted out of real
distinct individual events) remains the same, and unique.
Despite possible semantic confusions, we hope to communicate shared
meaning with our students, building ideas we think we understand, on
what seem to us to be ideas our students already possess, using deceptive
examples and slippery words whose ambiguity and incorrectness we are
unaware of, failing to recognise the fundamental difficulties that may arise,
and, instead, talking about our students’ “learning difficulties,” cognitive
confusion, attention deficits, (and in the face of a sentence such as this,
how is your attention?) and so on. 
Related issues arise when we are tempted to confuse a measurement
(which is a Korzybskian symbolic statement) with the thing being measured
(which Korzybski refers to as an “event”), compounded by the need to accept
the approximation (due to “experimental error”) unavoidably entailed in any
attempt to measure, and the need to be clear about what unit is being used
(which Korzybski calls an “object,” a mental construct). These issues are
forced on us when we try to teach students to round figures, to work real-
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istically with numbers, to approximate and then report the approximation
sensibly (pp. 140–143). 
Similar issues also arise when we confront the idea of a variable, and its
value. The letter C may represent some varying number of cheesecakes, in
a pre-algebra context. We may have 3 cheesecakes — in which case C = 3.
Students will often accept an initial letter interpretation of the C as an
abbreviation of the word “cheesecake”, and hence write 3C to represent
“three cheesecakes” — a valid approach in vectors, but flawed in simple
algebra (I have discussed this, and other algebra “traps” in Gough, 2004).
MacNeal gives a valuable self-diagnostic test of maths-semantic compe-
tence, including: round 0.098 to the nearest whole number. Many people
have difficulty rounding to zero. Why? Confusing “nothing” with “zero”, they
feel that zero is not a number, because a number is “something”. As an
example of MacNeal’s wit and constructive analysis, consider one of his
many summary points: “Nothing is a maths-semantic problem” (p 84). Nice
pun! Consider this: “How many polka-dotted zebras are in the staffroom?”
Or consider these possible replies to a typical mathematics question 
Q: Does the equation have a number of solutions? 
A: No, only one; or, 
A: No, there is no solution. 
These examples of language usage (there is one solution, or the number
of solutions is zero) suggest that 1 and 0 are not “numbers”. The point is
Korzybskian: language is slippery — so are the concepts intended by the
language.
Recommendations
1. Be alert for possible confusion in word meanings and usage.
This is one of the major problems. By the nature of learning, once we have
learned something we tend to forget what it was like not to know what has
now been learned. Hence, as we become familiar with technical terminology
and specialist concepts, we lose sight of earlier, vaguer alternatives. Those
teachers who can remember themselves struggling, as students, or recall
helpful advice from their own teachers, are well placed to be sensitive to the
potential struggles of their own students. Otherwise, we should listen to
what our students are saying, and respond constructively to things that are
wrong, only partly right, or confused.
2. Use student talking to negotiate and construct correct 
understanding.
It is essential that students become familiar with technical terminology and
specialist concepts; they need to learn to “speak” and “do” and “think”
mathematics in the way trained mathematicians do. This partly depends on
students working through earlier stages of being able to put their new ideas
into their own words. Sometimes this will be faulty. Sometimes the words
chosen will be imprecise or unhelpful slang. In middle primary school,
students often get into the wicked habit of talking about multiplying as
“times-ing.” One extremely clever undergraduate friend of mine used to talk
about “hitting” something with a function, when he meant substituting a
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value. His mathematical thinking was always correct but his explanations
to less able friends were not always clear or helpful. What is needed is a
progressive shaping or refining of initially rough approximations to correct
usage.
3. Examine new terms, symbols, techniques, diagrams, and 
technical “apparatus”.
• Is the new item clearly defined? Strong mathematical thinking and
learning depends crucially on clear, consecutive definitions, supported
by vivid experiences of what is defined, as well as learning what the defi-
nition does not mean.
• Is it accompanied by simple, sensible examples, alternatives, and
counter-examples? This can be problematic. It is hard to introduce (or
review) fractions, and present convincing examples of numbers that are
not fractions, namely, irrationals. At successive stages through the
developing curriculum we need to keep the curriculum as rich and
honest as our students can stand.
• Does the new item depend on possibly weakly grasped sub-concepts or
skills? If so, review and clarify these in direct association with the new
material.
• Can simple sketch diagrams be used to show the idea(s)? If so, draw and
discuss them. Verbal and symbolic learning of mathematics is greatly
strengthened by visual imagery, and sometimes by concrete three-
dimensional manipulatives.
• Does the new item have potentially confusing non-technical alternative
meanings? For example, the mathematical distinction between
“sequence” and “series” is not observed in these everyday synonyms:
emphasise crucial differences.
• Are there potentially confusing similar but different concepts? For
example, “volume” and “capacity.” If so, examine and clarify these.
• Can the new item be directly related to existing concepts or skills? For
example, is there a numerical counterpart to an algebraic expression or
process? Does a three-dimensional situation have a two-dimensional
counterpart? Does a verbal or algebraic concept have a diagrammatic
representation? 
• Does the new item involve special notation, syntax, and/or text-
formatting? If so, this needs to be clearly and repeatedly explained; e.g.,
Greek deltas (for increments, differences) and sigmas (sums, evolving
later into long-S integrals). 
Consider the importance of distinguishing (even for advanced students) a
handwritten multiplication symbol from a lower-case x, used as a pronumeral.
Similarly, emphasise the need for careful handwriting when using exponents,
superscripts, and subscripts — smaller characters, and deliberate raising or
lowering, spatially, relative to the main (invisible?) baseline for writing. 
It sounds trivial and/or silly to suggest that good book-keeping habits,
along with good handwriting, can be important in learning and doing
advanced mathematics; but it is true that slipshod penmanship, careless
use of columns and rows, and poor attention to “managing and showing all
(or enough) working,” can make life harder than it needs to be for consci-
entious students. 
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eflections on
esources
with 
Mary Coupland
Art and Complexity
J. Casti & A. Karlqvist (Eds)
Published by Elsevier
180 pp., hard cover, ISBN 978-0-444-50944-4
RRP: US$56.95
Areviewer of acollection of
conference papers
might be tempted to
point out the various
ways in which the
collection under
review falls short, or
fails to provide a
satisfying narrative
tour of the issues on
which the conference is centred.
But this is a churlish view to take of a confer-
ence that engaged with issues that defy easy
categorisation or unified understanding. The
essays in the collection have been contributed
by scientists interested in art and artists inter-
ested in complexity who were brought together
for a week-long workshop to exchange views on
how complexity and art fit together.
To a mathematician, complexity has some
very specific meanings that are unlikely to be
mirrored in an artist’s understanding of the
term. One thinks, for example, of the emergence
of complex behaviours from simple rules,
explored at length in Wolfram’s recent tour de
force A New Kind of Science; of the visually
astounding mappings of the Mandelbrot and
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My quest has ta
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 the physical,
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al, the delusion
al and back. An
d
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(screenplay by 
Tom Stoppard)
At the age of 11, I began Euclid, withmy brother as my tutor. This was oneof the great events of my life, asdazzling as first love. I had notimagined that there was anything sodelicious in the world.Bertrand Russell, 20th century mathematician and philosopher
Math is lik
e love -- 
a simple id
ea but it ca
n get comp
licated. 

